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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine an investment firm hired your client as a junior financial
analyst because of his previous employment as an intern at Exxon's
financial department. Your client's new employers made it clear his
previous "connections" would be instrumental to their firm, but he did
not give substantial thought to the comment and instead assumed that
Exxon experience is tremendous on any resume. One month into the
job, your client began getting pushed by other junior financial analysts
to reach out to his previous coworkers for details on Exxon's financial
performance before the next quarterly report. Your client did not want
to lose his first job with a decent paycheck, so he contacted a former
coworker and managed to attain such information from him.
As the year progressed, your client became accustomed to
acquiring Exxon's "insider" information and sending it to other junior
financial analysts who eventually provided it to a senior analyst.
Later, your client found out that the executive of the firm has been
profiting by trading based on the Exxon information your client
provided to the other analysts. Eventually your client's worst
nightmare materializes: the investment firm is under the investigation
of the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). He begins wondering,
"Am I liable? Are my superiors liable? To whom are they liable?"
The executive's conduct goes by the peculiar description of
"layering' and conscious avoidance."2 Unfortunately, the scenario
1. One attorney has summarized the effect of the Second Circuit's decision in
United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), by stating, "So long as you
are in the dark about the circumstances of the individual providing the information,
you are in the clear." Robert M. Appleton, Attorneys React To 2nd Circ. 's Insider
Trading Ruling, LAW 360 (Dec. 10, 2014, 4:44 PM) (Layering can be defined by its
plain meaning i.e., the act of being several persons (layers) away from the corporate
insider who misappropriates the material, nonpublic information.).
2. United States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 480 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal
citations omitted). Conscious avoidance is the act of avoiding the truth, and the
Svobada court gave the following definition as it pertains to jury instructions: "A
conscious avoidance instruction 'may only be given if (1) the defendant asserts the
lack of some specific aspect of knowledge required for conviction, and (2) the
appropriate factual predicate for the charge exists, i.e., "the evidence is such that a
rational juror may reach [the] conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt. . .that [the
defendant] was aware of a high probability [of the fact in dispute] and consciously
avoided confirming that fact[.]"' . . . The second prong of this test thus has two
110 [Vol. 52
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above is not a far-fetched hypothetical. In fact, the hypothetical is
analogous to the facts in the Second Circuit's recent decision in
United States. v Newman,3 which has taken the legal world in
securities by storm.4 The Newman decision has already had a
substantial impact on insider trading cases.5
Understanding the history of the laws governing securities
regulation is critical not only to attorneys and those dealing in the
securities market but also necessary for the advancement of securities
regulation. In the above hypothetical, the Exxon insider (i.e., tipper)
and your client (i.e., tippee) would be liable under the current state of
insider trading laws. 6 Yet, the executive (i.e., remote tippee) would
possibly not be liable even though he is committing the more
blameworthy' form of securities fraud that insider trading laws
originally sought to prevent. This Comment addresses the issue of
remote tippees by suggesting a new liability standard that Congress
should adopt, which is centered on the remote tippee's actual or
constructive knowledge.
Part II of this Comment provides a brief background on insider-
trading laws including the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act), the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act), and SEC Rule lOb-5. Part
components-there must be evidence that the defendant (1) was aware of a high
probability of the disputed fact and (2) deliberately avoided confirming that fact."
3. See United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443-45 (2d Cir. 2014), cert.
denied, 2015 WL 4575840.
4. See Max Stendahl, Newman Sends Insider Trading Shock Waves Beyond
SDNY, LAw360 (Feb. 17, 2015, 8:54 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
621776/newman-sends-insider-trading-shock-waves-beyond-sdny.; Pete Brush,
Defense Bar Backs 2nd Circ. Newman Insider Trading Reversal, LAw360 (Feb. 20,
2015, 4:35 PM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/623627/defense-bar-backs-2nd-
circ-newman-insider-trading-reversal.
5. "The ruling has since been used by 12 criminal defendants in the Southern
District of New York in requests to overturn convictions, vacate guilty pleas,
dismiss charges or receive leniency at sentencing." Stendahl, supra note 4.
6. See Newman, 773 F.3d 438; see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222 (1980).
7. Chief Justice Burger stated in his dissenting opinion, "The history of the
statute and of the Rule also supports this reading. The antifraud provisions were
designed in large measure 'to assure that dealing in securities is fair and without
undue preferences or advantages among investors."' Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 241
(Burger, J. dissenting) (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-229, at 91 (1975), as
reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 323.
2015] 111
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III will explain previous key cases to demonstrate the evolution of
tipper and tippee liability before US. v. Newman as well as the
changes caused by that decision.8 Part IV explains the effects of
current insider-trading laws and potential changes by Congress's
recently proposed bills. Finally, Part IV suggests a new standard for
tippee liability that Congress should adopt in order to prevent culpable
remote tippees from escaping securities fraud liability.
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF INSIDER TRADING
A. The Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934
The '33 Act was passed after the stock market crash of 1929 and
in the midst of the Great Depression.9 Congress's goal was to protect
investors by providing regulations that required "full and fair
disclosure" of all "material" information,o which means a
comprehensive disclosure of information that a prospective buyer
would want to know before making a decision."
For the most part, the '33 Act was narrow and provided several
anti-fraud provisions. For example, section 12(a)(2) created civil
liability for any individual who sold a security through a prospectus12
or oral communication that contained a material misstatement or
omission.13 Another example is section 17(a), which created liability
for fraudulent or deceitful sale of securities through the use of
8. See generally Newman, 773 F.3d 438.
9. Michael H. Dessent, Joe Six-Pack, United States v. O'Hagan, and Private
Securities Litigation Reform: A Line Must Be Drawn, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1137, 1145
(1998).
10. The Fulbright Bill: Extension of Investor Protection to Unlisted
Securities., 71 HARV. L. REV. 1337, 1338 (1958) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1933)).
11. Dessent, supra note 9, at 1145.
12. The term prospectus is defined as any "notice, circular, advertisement,
letter, or communication, written or by radio or television, which offers any security
for sale or confirms the sale of any security." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(10) (2012).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2012); see also Deepa Sarkar, Securities Act of
1933, CORNELL UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/securities act of 1933 (last visited Mar. 24, 2015).
112 [Vol. 52
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interstate commerce.1 4 However, after a year Congress realized the
failures of the limited '33 Act and the need for an administrative
agency to regulate stock market practices and enforce federal
securities laws; thus, the '34 Act was born.' 5
In contrast to the '33 Act, the '34 Act was broad and designed to
create an administrative agency' 6 to regulate the transaction of
securities in the secondary market.' 7 Congress stated that one of the
main goals of the '34 Act was "to assure that dealing in securities is
fair and without undue preferences or advantages among investors."18
Whether Congress's intention has been maintained as securities
regulation has evolved is discussed in Part III.
The '34 Act's direct regulation of the secondary market includes
disclosure requirements as in the '33 Act, but the pivotal sections are
10(b)" and 16(a) and (b).20 Section 10(b) has now become the
foundation of insider trading cases and its contrast in detail to section
16 is peculiar in its extensive and controversial requirements.21
Section 16 has specific language and strict requirements that compel
directors, officers, and principal stockholders of a corporation, whose
14. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012); see also Sarkar, supra note 13.
15. Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A
Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 347 (1988).
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2012).
17. The secondary market includes transactions after the initial public offering
by the issuer such as the purchase or sale of security from another investor. Deepa
Sarkar, Securities Act of 1934, CORNELL UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW,
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/securitiesexchangeact-of 1934 (last visited Mar.
24, 2015).
18. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 241 (1980) (citing H.R. CONF.
REP. NO. 94-229, at 91 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 321, 323).
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); see also Dessent, supra note 9.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (2012).
21. Dessent, supra note 9, at 1146-48. The author states that a "startling
comparison" arises between detail in § 10(b) and § 16. Furthermore, he comments
that even though Rule 10b-5, the SEC's offspring of 10(b), has been "characterized
as an anti-fraud provision, Rule 10b-5 has been used to bar insider trading without
ever speaking of those terms. The legislative history gives some indication that
insider trading is without ever speaking of those terms. The legislative history gives
some indication that insider trading is one of the evils the section was intended to
address, but there is little evidence of what types of insider trading would be
considered manipulative or deceptive within the meaning of the section."
2015] 113
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shares are traded on a national securities exchange, to file statements
with the SEC within ten days of becoming a beneficial owner,
director, or officer of such corporation.22 In addition, section 16
prevents the "unfair use of information which may have been obtained
by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his
relationship to the issuer" by precluding such persons from realizing
any profit from the purchase or sale of a security, within less than six
months, irrespective of intentions. 23 Furthermore, section 16 creates
conditions limiting any sales if the seller does not own the security
sold or does not deliver it within twenty days. 24 On the other hand,
section 10(b) has the following broad language:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange - (b)
to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, or any securities-based swap agreement any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.25
This small paragraph is the entire foundation for insider trading
cases. 26 Section 10(b) has been described by the courts as a "catch-all
provision" even though the provision itself, and Rule lOb-5, do not
explicitly ban insider trading. 27 It was not until 1948 that the SEC,
under the authority of section 10(b), created Rule 1Ob-5 allowing
federal district and circuit courts to begin "facilitat[ing] pro-
22. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(2)(B) (2012).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (2012).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012) (footnote omitted).
26. In the following section (Part I, B), Justice Rehnquist writing the majority
opinion in Blue Chips v. Manor Drug Stores expresses a similar view regarding §
10(b) and the expansion of securities regulation built upon its brief and ambiguous
language. See generally Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975).
27. Newman, 773 F.3d at 445 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185, 202-06).
[Vol. 52114
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prosecutorial efforts against insider trading." 28  Similar to section
10(b), lOb-5 is brief with little context and it states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) to
employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c)
to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.29
The history behind Rule lob-5 is that members of the SEC
gathered around and passed a note with the 1 Ob-5 language written on
it and "tossed it on the table, indicating approval" after hearing of a
company president who was defrauding his own shareholders by
purchasing their stock after he had told them the company was doing
poorly.30 Furthermore, in a rather humorous recollection, the Rule
lOb-5 draftsman stated, "Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike
[an SEC committee member] who said, 'Well ... we are against fraud
aren't we?' That is how it happened." 3 1
Today, the expanded state of insider trading regulation is a result
of the SEC and courts' expansive interpretation of the statute, and not
of the language as originally passed by the '34 Act.32 Regardless,
understanding the legislative foundation will put into perspective how
the current state and continuing development of insider trading
regulation are expanding the original intentions of the '34 Act in order
to adjust to the evolving securities market.
28. Dessent, supra note 9, at 1142.
29. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015).
30. Carlos L. Israels, Book Review, 77 YALE L.J. 1585, 1587 (1968)
(reviewing ALAN R. BROMBERG, SECuRITIEs LAW: FRAUD: SEC RULE 10B-5
(1967)).
31. Israels, supra note 29, at 1587 (citing a quote from Milton Freeman at a
Conference of Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, see n.9).
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). Part III of this Comment discusses the
evolution of insider trading regulation.
2015] 115
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B. From Legislative Acorn to Judicial Oak, Insider Trading Defined
Today, a person committing fraud in the securities market can be
held liable under one of the two established theories of insider trading:
the "classical theory" and the "misappropriation theory." 33  This
section previews these laws in their present form before Part III's
explanation on how these theories were formed.
The two theories are centered on the notion that insider trading is
a form of securities fraud that section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 were
created to prevent. 34  The classical theory holds that a corporate
insider violates section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 when he trades in the
corporation's securities on the basis of nonpublic, material
information.3 5 The violation is based on the concept that there is a
fiduciary duty between shareholder(s) of a corporation and those who
obtain the information because of their position within the corporation
i.e., corporate insider. 36 As a result of the fiduciary duty, corporate
insiders have a duty to either abstain from trading or disclose such
information. 37  If the corporate insider trades or fails to disclose
material, nonpublic information then that "qualifies as a 'deceptive
device"' under section 10(b).38
The Supreme Court has a history of avoiding the second theory,
known as the misappropriation theory. 39 While the classical theory
creates liability for corporate insiders, the misappropriation theory
expands liability to corporate outsiders. 40  Specifically, the
misappropriation theory holds that an outsider is liable if he or she
possesses material, nonpublic information about a corporation and
uses that information to trade in breach of a "duty" owed to the source
of that information.4 '
33. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-53 (1997).
34. Newman, 773 F.3d at 445 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,
226-30 (1980)).
35. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226-30.
3 6. Id.
37. Id. at 228-30.
38. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
39. See Dessent, supra note 9, at 1164-90, for the author's detailed coverage of
the misappropriation theory's history in the courts.
40. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-53.
41. Id. at 652-53.
116 [Vol. 52
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While the misappropriation theory had mostly been ignored by
Supreme Court cases, both theories are now accepted and applied for
tipper and tippee liability i.e., liability for the person divulging (tipper)
or receiving (tippee) material, nonpublic information and trading on
the basis of that information.4 2 With regard to the expanded scope of
insider trading, the late Justice Rehnquist famously stated, "When we
deal with private actions under Rule 1Ob-5, we deal with a judicial oak
which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn." 43  The
current contention has been caused by a recent surprise by the Second
Circuit and its decision on tippee liability.44 For this reason, the rest
of this Comment will focus on the evolution of tipper and tippee
liability with particular attention to the latter.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF TIPPER AND TIPPEE LIABILITY
IN THE HIGHEST COURT
Incredibly, since the landmark case Dirks v. S.E.C., there have
only been two Supreme Court cases within the past five years to even
mention Dirks.45 Even more surprising, neither of those cases
discusses the misappropriation theory for tipper or tippee liability.4 6
One might infer the Supreme Court believed there was no need to
address the misappropriation theory as applied to remote tippees, or
perhaps that the Court was sending a message to Congress.
Irrespective of the reason, this section explains the development of
tipper and tippee liability in the Supreme Court.
42. Id. at 652-54.
43. Blue Chips, 421 U.S. at 737.
44. See Newman, 773 F.3d 438.
45. The progeny of Dirks includes: United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642
(1997); Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164 (1994); Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Carpenter v. United
States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987). The two recent cases are: Halliburton Co. v. Erica P.
John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014); Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First
Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
46. See generally Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S.
Ct. 2296 (2011); see also Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2398 (2014).
2015] 117
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A. The Beginning: "Equal Access" to Information Theory
Justice Blackmun once referred to the Second Circuit as the,
"justifiably esteemed panel . . . [and] the 'Mother Court' in this area of
the law." 47 As will be shown below, Justice Blackmun's comment is
more than appropriate.
The Second Circuit's decision in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
was one of the earliest pivotal cases on insider trading that went
"beyond the common law and into the realm of § 10(b)." 48 In Texas
Gulf, the SEC sought an appeal to convict all fourteen Defendants
including Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. rather than only the two individuals
that the lower court convicted.49 In a dramatic turnaround, the Court
reversed many of the dismissed complaints against the defendants and
found liability on the basis of a broad interpretation of section 10(b)
violations.50 Out of the defendants, five were officers and employees
who knew about a recent successful drilling venture (i.e., material,
nonpublic information) from Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. but still accepted
the company's stock options rather than disclosing the information or
rejecting the stock options."
The Court acknowledged the SEC's previous administrative
decision, In the Matter of Cady, Roberts, and Co., which limited
liability to insiders such as "directors or management officers" or
those "who may not be termed strictly an 'insider' within the meaning
of § 16(b)."52 However, the Court went beyond the test established in
47. Blue Chips Stamp, 421 U.S. at 762.
48. The article, Joe Six-Pack, does an expansive job of explaining all the case
law evolution in a more detailed manner. Please see generally Joe Six-Pack for a
deeper background of numerous lower court decisions. See generally Dessent, supra
note 9, at 1160 (citing SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co. 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir.
1968)).
49. Tex. Gulf 401 F.2d at 839-42.
50. Id. at 842-43.
51. Id. at 844.
52. Id. at 848. The author of Joe Six-Pack best summarizes the SEC's
administrative decision, In the Matter of Cady, Roberts, and Co., that creates the
"traditional insider" and "non-traditional insider" distinction. The summary states,
"Traditional insiders were typically identified as directors, officers, or controlling
shareholders who had always been considered such under common law. However,
the SEC extended Rule lOb-5's duty to 'disclose inside information or abstain from
trading,' to all persons who enjoy 'a relationship giving access, directly or
118 [Vol. 52
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Cady and held that, "anyone in possession of material inside
information must either disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is
disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate confidence,
or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading ... while such
inside information remains undisclosed." 53  Thus, liability was
expanded to "anyone in possession" of material, nonpublic
information - including non-insiders even if there was no breach of
fiduciary duty.54 As a result, the Court overturned a geologist's
dismissal and held that he violated section 10(b) for tipping material
information regarding a successful drilling venture, but the Court did
not consider the liability of the various tippees since they were not
listed as defendants.
In essence, Texas Gulf held that the "core of Rule 1Ob-5" is that
"all investors should have equal access to the rewards of participation
in securities transactions" and that "members of the investing public
should be subject to identical market risks . ."5 The standard set
forth by Texas Gulf has been recognized as the equal access theory,
and the SEC advanced this theory for many years until the Supreme
Court said otherwise. 57
It would not be until several years later that the Supreme Court
severely limited Texas Gulf by narrowing the right to a private cause
of action under lOb-5 to purchasers or sellers.s Yet, because the
Supreme Court did not directly reject the equal access theory, the
Second Circuit would again implement it to uphold a conviction in
U.S. v. Chiarella.59 The Second Circuit reiterated that any "corporate
insider or not who regularly receives material nonpublic information
may not use that information to trade in securities without incurring an
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose.'
Dessent, supra note 9 at 1159.
53. Tex. Gulf, 401 F.2d at 848.
54. Dessent, supra note 9, at 1161 (citing Tex. Gulf 401 F.2d at 848).
55. Tex. Gulf 401 F.2d at 852-53.
56. Id. at 851-52.
57. See generally Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222.
58. While the Court narrowed who could bring a cause of action, it never
explicitly rejected the Equal Access Theory, which left it open for the SEC to use for
a few more years until Chiarella v. United States. See Blue Chips Stamp, 421 U.S.
at 731.
59. See United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978).
2015] 119
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affirmative duty to disclose. And if he cannot disclose, he must
abstain from buying or selling." 60 Thus, though refined, the equal
access theory lived on, but it would only do so for two more years.
B. The Rise of the "Classical Theory" ofInsider Trading
In 1980, the Second Circuit's Chiarella decision was the first
major case to reach the Supreme Court.61 In Chiarella, there was no
tipper since the information was taken by the tippee who was
providing printing services for acquiring corporations. 62 In fact, the
acquiring corporations had left all names, including target
corporations, out of printing until the night before the final printing. 6 3
Even so, the printer found out the names of the target companies and
bought and sold shares without revealing his misuse of the
information, which gave him a relatively small profit in slightly over a
year.64
While there was an opportunity for the Court to side with the
S.E.C. and broaden section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to punish misuse of
material, nonpublic information, the Court declined to do so. 65
Instead, the Court clarified that section 10(b) had no legislative history
that suggested there was a general duty to everyone to not act on
material, nonpublic information. 66 Furthermore, the Court indicated
that duty has never been expanded so that it "departs radically from
the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific relationship
between two parties ... [and a duty] should not be undertaken absent
some explicit evidence of congressional intent." 67
In the end, the Supreme Court held that there must be fraud, and if
there is no duty to speak then fraud cannot be established. 68 The
Court held that the lower court "failed" to find a relationship that
establishes a duty (to disclose or abstain) and that basing its decision
60. Id.
61. See generally Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222.
62. Id. at 224.
63. Id. at 224.
64. Id. at 224.
65. See id. at 234-35.
66. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
67. Id. at 233.
68. Id. at 235.
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solely on equal access to information was flawed.6 9 In essence, the
Court closed the door on the equal access theory and parity-of-
information rule70 by holding that possession of material, nonpublic
information does not create the duty to disclose." Furthermore, the
Court would not consider a duty to the source of the information
simply on the grounds that it was not submitted to the jury.7 2
It is interesting to note that in a footnote to Chiarella, the Court
states that tippees "have a duty not to profit from the use of inside
information that they know is confidential and know or should know
came from a corporate insider." 73  However, the Court would not
substantively address tippees and instead laid the foundation for
shifting the basis of insider trading laws from equal access to duty,
particularly on the duty of corporate insiders. 74
At the same time, however, Chief Justice Burger wrote a lengthy
dissent that supported a less restrictive section 10(b) interpretation: "a
person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an
absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading."s7
The following year, the Second Circuit and SEC embraced the theory
espoused by the late Chief Justice and "indicted ... a registered
securities trader and analyst, and charged him with violating § 10(b)
and RulelOb-5 for his role in purchasing shares in tender offer target
companies based on undisclosed information about pending, but
secret, mergers and acquisitions." 7 6  The misappropriation theory
69. Id. at 231-32.
70. Justice Blackmun clarifies the distinction between equal access and parity-
of-information by stating, "there is a significant conceptual distinction between
parity of information and parity of access to material information. The latter gives
free rein to certain kinds of informational advantages that the former might
foreclose, such as those that result from differences in diligence or acumen. Indeed,
by limiting opportunities for profit from manipulation of confidential connections or
resort to stealth, equal access helps to ensure that advantages obtained by honest
means reap their full reward." Id. at 252 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
71. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
72. Id. at 236.
73. Id. at 252 n.12.
74. See id. at 235.
75. Dessent, supra note 9, at 1166 (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting)).
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began to expand to other circuits but was not recognized until much
later by the Supreme Court.
Just three years after Chiarella, another pivotal case made its way
to the Supreme Court: Dirks v. S.E. C.77 Dirks was an officer of a
broker-dealer firm focused on providing investment analysis. When
he discovered information of potential fraud in a company involved
with his broker-dealer firm, Dirks began an investigation.7 9 During
the investigation, Dirks reached out to management who denied any
fraud; however, some employees actually corroborated the fraud
charges.so While continuing the investigation, he discussed the
charges with investors and clients who eventually sold their shares in
the company, including some investors who liquidated more than $16
million in stock.8 ' As a result, the SEC charged Dirks with aiding and
abetting fraud and argued that regardless of the tipper's "occupation or
motivation," the tipper has a duty to refrain from trading or disclosing
material, nonpublic information. 82
The Supreme Court held that the test for tippers is "whether the
insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his
disclosure [to the tippee]. Absent some personal gain, there has been
no breach of duty to stockholders." 83 As a result, tippee liability is
established because of the breach of fiduciary duty of the tipper who
disclosed material, nonpublic information for personal gain. 84
The Court elaborated that a tippee "assumes a fiduciary duty to
the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic
information only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to
the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the
76. Ironically, the Second Circuit case was titled U.S. v. Newman but has no
relation to the recent decision by the same Court under the same name, which is the
basis of this Comment. Dessent, supra note 9, at 1167-68 (citing United States v.
Newman 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, United States v. Mahaffy, 693
F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2012)).
77. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
78. Id. at 648.
79. Id. at 649.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 650-51.
83. Id. at 662.
84. Id. at 659.
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tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach." 5 The
Court did not directly state that the tippee must know or should know
of the personal benefit, but stated that the "tippee knew the
information was given to him in breach of a duty by a person having a
special relationship to the issuer not to disclose the information."86
The holding made it clear that Dirks was not liable because the person
who disclosed the information to him was a whistleblower and not
tipping for personal benefit in breach of fiduciary duty. 87
Consequently, the Court left open the question regarding remote
tippees and the personal knowledge requirement.8 8
C. The "Misappropriation Theory" and the Divide
Among the Circuits
The next three relevant Supreme Court cases8 9 set the stage for
another landmark case, 90 which finally addressed the misappropriation
theory. In 1987, the Supreme Court held - in a plurality opinion -
that trading on information confidential to a newspaper source prior to
being released to the public is sufficient for mail and wire fraud; thus,
affirming the lower court.9 1  Instead of directly addressing the
misappropriation theory, the Court recognized it was "evenly divided"
on the theory and upheld the conviction solely on mail and wire
fraud.92
Between 1986 and 1991, the Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
joined the Second Circuit in holding that the misappropriation theory
is viable under section 10(b).9 During that time period, the Supreme
85. Id. at 660.
86. Id. at 661.
87. See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 666-67.
88. See Dirks, 463 U.S. 646.
89. Cent. Bank, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994);
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S.
19 (1987).
90. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
91. See Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 28.
92. Id. at 24; see also Dessent, supra note 9, at 1174.
93. See Dessent, supra note 9, at 1178-79 (citing Rothberg v. Rosenbloom,
771 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017 (1987); SEC v. Cherif, 933
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Court again reviewed another section 10(b) case, but the Court
focused only on material misrepresentations and the fraud on the
market theory associated with misrepresentations. 94  Several years
later, the Supreme Court held that private individuals cannot bring an
"aiding and abetting" cause of action under section 10(b), again
refusing to address the misappropriation theory.95 It took the rejection
of the misappropriation theory in the Fourth and Eighth Circuit Courts
for the Supreme Court to finally address the theory.9 6
The landmark Supreme Court case came in 1997 and this time, the
Court did not avoid the misappropriation theory.97 In United States v.
O'Hagan, O'Hagan was a firm partner, who was retained to represent
a company in their potential tender offer for common stock in
Pillsbury Company.9 8  Both the company and the law firm took
actions to protect confidentiality issues, and O'Hagan was at no point
working on the representation. 99  While representation was still
ongoing, O'Hagan began purchasing options that gave him the right to
purchase shares, and he eventually purchased 5,000 shares.' 00 Once
the company announced its tender offer for Pillsbury, O'Hagan sold
both his options and stock, resulting in a profit over $4.3 million. 101
Eventually, the S.E.C. began an investigation and charged
O'Hagan with defrauding his law firm and the firm's client.1 02 In
reversing an Eight Circuit dismissal of criminal charges, the Court
responded clearly by stating that criminal liability on the basis of the
misappropriation theory is valid under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-
5.103 The Court elaborated that an individual commits fraud under
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 when he "misappropriates confidential
information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed
F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992); and SEC v. Clark, 915
F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990)).
94. See Levinson, 485 U.S. at 241-45.
95. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
96. Dessent, supra note 9, at 1184-87.
97. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 647-48.
101. Id.at648.
102. Id.
103. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 649-50.
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to the source of the information."l 04  Therefore, the fiduciary
relationship in the misappropriation theory is between the entrusted
individual and the person(s) or company who gave the individual
material nonpublic information, as opposed to the classical theory's
fiduciary relationship between the corporate insider and the
shareholders.1 05  The Court made a vital observation that the
misappropriation theory was created to protect the securities market
against fraud even by those who have access to material, nonpublic
information, but do not owe a fiduciary duty to a corporation or
shareholders. 10 6
Lastly, the Court affirmed the Dirks standard that "'a tippee
assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to
trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has
breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the
information to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that
there has been a breach."'10 7 Again, as in Dirks, the Court at no point
expanded or implied that knowledge of a personal benefit standard to
the tipper is required for tippees to be held liable. 0 8 This vital point
sets the stage for the Second Circuit's controversial case, and the
focus of this Comment.
D. U.S. v. Newman's "Clarification" Regarding Tippee Liability
While there has been no protesting in the streets by the general
public or legal community, most individuals in the securities practice
and field have been surprised by the Second Circuit's U.S. v. Newman
decision.1 09 Yet, it was only a matter of time before a case with the
ideal fact pattern challenged the gray area of law on insider trading.
The Second Circuit's decision could force the Supreme Court to
elaborate on remote tippee liability under the misappropriation theory.
The more probable scenario is for the Supreme Court to wait for
substantial circuit splits or allow Congress to resolve the issue.
104. Id. at 652.
105. Id. at 651-52.
106. Id. at 653.
107. Id. at 675 (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660).
108. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642.
109. See Stendahl, supra note 4.
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Although, if Congress is feeling pressure and is attempting to pass
some bills,"o then there is a strong chance the Supreme Court is aware
of the issue raised by the "Mother Court's" decision.
In U.S. v. Newman, the Government argued that Newman, a
portfolio manager at a hedge fund called Diamondback Capital
Management (Diamondback), and Chiasson, a hedge fund co-founder
of Level Global Investors (Global), participated in an insider trading
scheme along with several insider analysts."' One of the corporate
insiders was a Dell employee who had access to Dell's financial
information and would - for eight quarters - disclose those
consolidated earnings." 2  The earnings information was then
disclosed to an investor outside of Dell, who would then disclose that
confidential information to employees of Newman and Chiasson's
respective firms, which eventually reached the Defendants.1 3 The
Dell insider disclosed the confidential information even though he was
trained and warned about Dell's strict policies that prohibited
disclosure of any confidential information, especially unannounced
earning numbers."14
The Government argued that another insider, who worked for
NVIDIA Corporation, was also involved in the insider trading
scheme. 15 The NVIDIA insider disclosed the confidential
information, which few individuals in the corporation could access, to
a long-time church friend.1 6  Similar to the Dell confidential
information, the NVIDIA confidential information was disclosed to
another investor before being disclosed to employees of Newman and
Chiasson who eventually provided the information to the
Defendants." 7 In both instances, the insider's disclosed confidential
information was passed along through several layers of either friends
110. See Stephanie Russell-Kraft, Litigators Fear Congressional Fixes To
Newman, LAW360 (Mar. 31, 2015, 1:28 PM), http://www.law360.com/
articles/636522/litigators-fear-congressional-fixes-to-newman.
111. Brief for the United States at 3, United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438,
443 (2d Cir. 2014) (Nos. 13-1837(L), 13-1917(CON), 2013 WL 6163307.
112. Id. at 5.
113. Id. at 5-6.
114. Id. at 9-10.
115. Id. at 12-14.
116. Id. at 12-14.
117. Brief for the United States, supra note 111, at 12-14.
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or other investors before reaching Newman and Chiasson (remote
tippees) and their respective employees.11 8
Next, the Government asserted that both corporate insiders
personally benefitted from the disclosure of confidential information
i.e., material nonpublic information."'9 The Dell insider's alleged
benefit for tipping the material nonpublic information was career
advice and assistance from the investor, who was experienced in the
area of work the Dell insider sought.1 20 As for the NVIDIA insider,
his personal benefit was maintaining the close friendship with his
church friend (immediate tippee).121
The Second Circuit in Newman quickly rejected the Government's
understanding of tippee liability and stated that the following was the
actual test the Supreme Court had expressed earlier:
[W]e hold that to sustain an insider trading conviction against a
tippee, the Government must prove each of the following elements
beyond a reasonable doubt: that (1) the corporate insider was
entrusted with a fiduciary duty; (2) the corporate insider breached
his fiduciary duty by (a) disclosing confidential information to a
tippee (b) in exchange for a personal benefit; (3) the tippee knew of
the tipper's breach, that is, he knew the information was
confidential and divulged for personal benefit; and (4) the tippee
still used that information to trade in a security or tip another
individual for personal benefit.1 22
In its reasoning, the Second Circuit maintained that the
"Government relie[d] on dicta in a number of our decisions post-
Dirks, in which we have described the elements of tippee liability
without specifically stating that the Government must prove that the
tippee knew that the corporate insider who disclosed confidential
information did so for his own personal benefit."1 23  The Court
believed that the Government was trying to re-establish the ban on
tippee trading that Dirks rejected and would not accept the
118. Id. at 5-14.
119. Id. at 14-17.
120. Id. at 14-15.
121. Id. at 16-17.
122. Newman, 773 F.3d at 450.
123. Id. at 447.
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Government's interpretation of Dirks.124 Instead, the Court expressly
stated that the tippee's derived liability must be based on a personal
benefit to the tipper that is "objective, consequential, and represents at
least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature[,]"
which requires evidence of the tipper-tippee relationship that implies a
quid pro quo from the tippee, or an intention to benefit the tippee. 125
Furthermore, the Second Circuit repeated that an insider's
disclosure of confidential information alone is not a breach, and
without establishing that the tippee knows of a personal benefit to the
tipper, there cannot be proof of knowledge about the breach of
fiduciary duty.126 Lastly, the Court struck down the equal access
theory that had been left open for years and stated, "[I]n both
Chiarella and Dirks, the Supreme Court affirmatively established that
insider trading liability is based on breaches of fiduciary duty, not on
informational asymmetries" and that "nothing in the law requires a
symmetry of information in the nation's securities markets."1 27 While
the Court did make some major clarifications, it still knowingly left
open the rdmote tippee question.
IV. CONGRESS SHOULD ADOPT A NEW TIPPEE LIABILITY STANDARD
A. Considerations on Remote Tippees and the Securities Market
Structure After Newman
As shown in Part III, many of the decisions that eventually
reached the Supreme Court originated from the Second Circuit, which
makes Justice Blackmun's previously mentioned "Mother Circuit"
quote understandable. Assuming that the Second Circuit is aware of
its influence in securities regulation, one is left wondering why the
Court did not use Newman as a vehicle to provide a complete answer
to the issue of remote tippees.1 28
124. See id.
125. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452 (quoting United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147,
153 (2d Cir. 2013)).
126. Id. at 448.
127. Id. at 449.
128. See Newman, 773 F.3d 438.
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The Newman Court explicitly acknowledged that its previous
decisions "involved tippees who directly participated in the tipper's
breach. . . or tippees who were explicitly apprised of the tipper's gain
by an intermediary tippee."129 Yet, instead of defining remote tippee
liability, the Court interpreted previous Supreme Court decisions to
"clarify" that tippees must have knowledge of the personal benefit to
the tipper.130 The decision not only ignored the question as to remote
tippees but also raised the standard for holding any tippees liable.' 3 1
The Court's failure to address the distinction between tippees and
remote tippees, while at the same time increasing the difficulty to
prosecute any tippees, is perplexing especially when the Court
recognized that its precedent has not addressed the issue.' 32
The Government offered the Second Circuit the opportunity to
address remote tippees when it argued in its brief that the jury
instruction on conscious avoidance was correct. 13 3 One of the cases
the Government cited is U.S. v. Svoboda, which states that "[a]
conscious avoidance instruction 'may only be given if (1) the
defendant asserts the lack of some specific aspect of knowledge
required for conviction, . . . and (2) the appropriate factual predicate
for the charge exists .. . . Specifically, the second prong of the
exam requires two elements "evidence that the defendant (1) was
aware of a high probability of the disputed fact and (2) deliberately
avoided confirming that fact." 35
In Svoboda, the defendants were long-time friends who were
found guilty of engaging in a conspiracy to commit securities fraud.1 36
One of the defendants worked for a bank as a credit policy officer and
because of his position had access to confidential information
regarding the bank's clients. 3 7 He then passed the information to the
129. Id. at 448 (citing United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 150 (2d Cir. 2013)).
130. See id. at 450.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 448.
133. Brief for the United States, supra note 111, at 66.
134. United States v. Svoboda, 347 F.3d 471, 480 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing
United States v. Ferrarini 219 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2000)).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 475.
137. Svoboda, 347 F.3d at 475.
2015] 129
22
California Western Law Review, Vol. 52 [2015], No. 1, Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol52/iss1/6
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAw REVIEW
second defendant who traded on the basis of that information., 3 8
Similar to its prior precedent the Newman court referenced, the tipper
and tippee relationship in Svoboda was direct (i.e., one friend was the
informed insider and the other friend was the person who traded on
the basis of the material, nonpublic information).139
For this reason, the Second Circuit had no problem finding that
the second defendant knew the information was confidential as a
result of the first defendant's position.1 40  Furthermore, the Court
found that the timing, as well as the high return on the trades, was so
suspicious that the lack of actual knowledge was the result of
consciously avoiding confirming the fact.1 4 1
In Newman, the Government argued there was more than
sufficient evidence to prove a rational juror could have found the
defendant had knowledge of a high probability that he received tips of
confidential information in violation of a duty but consciously avoided
confirming it. 142 The Government stated that Newman's analyst told
Newman of his source at Dell, and that the insider was an accounting
manager at the company.1 43 In addition, the Government contended
that Newman received "specific tips concerning Dell's . . . revenues
and gross margins before the information was publicly announced,
which Newman - a sophisticated hedge fund manager - knew was
confidential."1 44
The Government also indicated that Newman, on numerous
occasions, received material nonpublic information before quarterly
earnings announcements and knew that his analyst's contact could
only be contacted at night or on weekends. 145 Lastly, the profits made
on the trades stemming from the inside information amounted to
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Note that there was no issue with the first prong of the conscious
avoidance test because the second defendant denied he had knowledge of the
unlawful source of confidential information. Id. at 480-81.
141. Svoboda, 347 F.3d at 480-81.
142. Brief for the United States, supra note 111, at 70.
143. Id. at 70 (citing Tr. 160-61 and GX 805).
144. Id.
145. Id.
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approximately $4 million for Newman and $68 million for
Chiasson. 14 6
There are several similarities between Newman and Svoboda. As
in Svoboda, Newman denied actual knowledge of the unlawful source
of information and made significant profits within a suspicious time of
receiving the material, nonpublic information. 14 7 However, the key
difference is that unlike the defendants in Svoboda, there was no direct
relationship between the tipper and the tippee.1 4 8 In Svoboda, the
defendants were long-time friends; hence, there was an inference that
the defendant must have had actual knowledge or consciously avoided
confirming that the information was unlawful as a result of a breach of
duty by his friend.1 49
In contrast, in Newman, there is an attenuated chain of material
nonpublic information, which was passed down from a corporate
insider to an analyst to Newman's analyst before actually reaching
Newman. 150 Although the chain connecting the tipper and eventual
tippee was indirect, the timeliness and extraordinary profit created on
the basis of the information was so overwhelmingly suspicious that -
as the Government 15 ' contended - a sophisticated hedge fund
manager like Newman should have had actual knowledge that the
source of the information was unlawful, or if not, he consciously
avoided confirming so.
The chance for the Second Circuit to address remote tippees and
constructive knowledge could not have been more opportune for the
Court - yet it declined to do so. 152 Instead, the Second Circuit
briefly addressed conscious avoidance towards the end of its opinion
when it stated that the Government provided "absolutely no testimony
or any other evidence that Newman ... knew.. . [he was] trading on
information obtained from insiders ... or even that that Newman ...
146. Newman, 773 F.3d at 443.
147. Brief for the United States, supra note 111, at 69-70.
148. Newman, 773 F.3d at 443.
149. Svoboda, 347 F.3d at 475, 480-81.
150. See Newman, 773 F.3d at 443.
151. See Brief for the United States, supra note 110, at 70-71.
152. The Supreme Court has a history of declining to comment or narrowly
addressing securities issues that the lower courts have raised. See Chiarella, 445
U.S. 222; Dirks, 463 U.S. 646.
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consciously avoided learning of these facts."' 5 3  The Court briefly
explained that the evidence demonstrated that insiders regularly
provided selective disclosures to analysts, and that apart from the
Government's own witnesses, no rational jury "would find that the
tips were so overwhelmingly suspicious" that Newman consciously
avoided knowledge of the source or beneficiary of the information.154
The Court's decision to make a strong statement against the
suspiciousness of the tips is surprising. If anything, the facts of this
case seemed perfect for the "Mother Court" to clarify and include
liability for remote tippees. After all, if there is no liability for a
sophisticated hedge fund manager, then what is the purpose of Rule
1Ob-5?
B. A Critique of U.S. v. Newman
The issue with the Newman holding goes beyond duty, equal
access to information, or proving the tippee was aware of the personal
benefit. Instead, it reverts to the fundamental balance between
securities market efficiency and confidentiality.15 5 By not addressing
remote tippees and instead raising the standard for liability, it is
submitted that the Court has harmed the securities market by
weakening the protection of confidentiality, which in turn harms the
efficiency of the securities market. Some of the potential harms to
efficiency include: (a) delayed buying and selling because of
increased concerns that selective disclosures are occurring and other
investors who have relationships with insiders can attain confidential
information; (b) firms have to find rigorous and costly methods of
protecting information from unauthorized selective disclosures; and
(c) enforcement against inside trading dampened by higher standard
causing more risk and unfairness in the market.
153. Newman, 773 F.3d at 453.
154. Id. at 454-55.
155. The Second Circuit in Newman acknowledges this balance between
confidentiality and efficiency by stating, "[B]oth Chiarella and Dirks, the Supreme
Court affirmatively established that insider trading liability is based on breaches of
fiduciary duty, not on informational asymmetries. This is a critical limitation on
insider trading liability that protects a corporation's interests in confidentiality while
promoting efficiency in the nation's securities markets." Id. at 449.
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The distinction between tippee and remote tippee should be trivial
as it pertains to liability because in the end the result is the same fraud:
trading on material, nonpublic information at the expense of
shareholder(s) and/or the corporation itself However, while the
consequences to the securities market are the same fraud,
sophisticated remote tippees are more culpable, and securities
regulation should recognize that important distinction. Currently,
courts base liability on a duty regardless of whether it is a worker in a
printing company or a sophisticated hedge fund manager. 5 6 But that
strict adherence and interpretation of duty - as the focus of liability
- allows for the possibility of tippees to create layers between
themselves in order to break the chain of duty and can then
consciously avoid confirming the source of the information.
Once a sophisticated remote tippee can establish a system to
acquire material, nonpublic information without knowing the source
of the information, the tippee can no longer be liable under current
insider trading precedent. The reason is because the tippee no longer
has a duty to the source of the information and is unaware of any
benefits the tipper might have gained. In a nation were elaborate and
fraudulent schemes are discovered often, it seems surprising the courts
are unwilling to extend tippee liability to the most egregious fraud
caused by sophisticated remote tippees.
The consequence is that the confidential information of a
corporation is no longer protected, and the securities market is only
efficient for those with the resources and sophistication to avoid
liability.
C. Recent Bills By Congress Addressing Insider Trading
Several Congress members have already taken notice of the
Newman decision and have proposed their own solutions regarding
insider trading."' Congressional action, rather than SEC or court
action, is a step in the right direction. This is because Congress
consists of elected representatives with a system of checks and
balances, albeit a tedious and lengthy system at times. There is one
bill currently pending in the Senate, and two in the House of
156. See Newman, 773 F.3d 438; Dirks, 463 U.S. 646; Chiarella, 445 U.S.
222.
157. Russell-Kraft, supra note 110.
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Representatives.' This section will briefly review those bills and
analyze potential problems that should be addressed as they make
their way through the legislative process.
First is Senate Bill 702, titled "Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act,"
and co-authored by Senator Jack Reed and Senator Bob Menendez.1 59
Senator Reed's website states Senate Bill 702 intends to define insider
trading with a "bright line rule: if a person trades a security on the
basis of material information that he or she knows or has reason to
know is not publicly available, then he or she has engaged in unlawful
insider trading."' 60
Specifically, Senate Bill 702's main language reads as follows:
(d)(1)(A) To purchase, sell, or cause the purchase or sale of any
security on the basis of material information that the person knows
or has reason to know is not publicly available.
(B) To knowingly or recklessly communicate material information
that the person knows or has reason to know is not publicly
available to any other person under circumstances in which it is
reasonably foreseeable that such communication is likely to result
in a violation of subparagraph (A).' 6 '
The bill's failure to include express language regarding a
fiduciary duty or breach of fiduciary duty is the bill's most glaring
omission.1 62  In fact, the authors purposefully omitted all duty
language, indicating "it would be irrelevant whether a trader knew of a
source's fiduciary duty or whether the source derived any personal
benefit for tipping the inside information."1 63
The Section (d)(1)(A) language, which reads "has reason to know
is not publicly available[,]" shifts the focus from duty to knowledge,
and creates the opportunity for tippee liability to be based solely on
158. Id.
159. Reed & Menendez Introduce Bill to Clearly Define and Ban Unlawful
Insider Trading, JACK REED (Mar. 11, 2015),
http://www.reed.senate.gov/news/releases/reed-and-menendez-introduce-bill-to-
clearly-define-and-ban-unlawful-insider-trading.
160. Id.
161. Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. (2015).
162. See S. 702.
163. Reed & Menendez Introduce Bill to Clearly Define and Ban Unlawful
Insider Trading, supra note 158.
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constructive knowledge.' 64  Thus, the Senate bill is in essence the
purest form of the equal access theory - no trading on any material,
nonpublic information - that Justice Burger advocated in his dissent
against the Chiarella majority.' 6 5 The shift from duty to knowledge
(i.e., the equal access theory) is clear with the authors' emphasis on
"whether the trader knew or had reason to know that he or she had an
unfair advantage . . . ."166 While the emphasis on knowledge,
including constructive knowledge, is the first step in holding remote
tippees liable, the elimination of duty fosters an inefficient securities
market and forces, extensive confirmation of lawful information when
not all "financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under §
10(b)."l 67
The next bill is H.R. 1625 titled "Insider Trading Prohibition
Act," and is authored by Congressman Jim Himes.1 68 Congressman
Himes describes H.R. 1625 as providing "a clear, consistent definition
of insider trading that will improve the fairness and integrity of the
markets. Confidence is a critical ingredient of effective and efficient
markets, and this bill will provide ordinary investors with the
confidence they need to invest in our markets." 69 The language of
the bill amends section 16 of the '34 Act to read:
(a) Prohibition Against Trading Securities While In Possession Of
Material, Nonpublic Information. - It shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly, to purchase, sell, . . . if such person
knows, or recklessly disregards, that such information has been
obtained wrongfully, or that such purchase, sale, or entry would
constitute a wrongful use of such information.
(b) Prohibition Against The Wrongful Communication Of Certain
Material, Nonpublic Information. - It shall be unlawful for any
person [to] ... wrongfully to communicate material, nonpublic
information relating to such security .. . to any other person if -
164. S. 702,
165. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 241.
166. Reed & Menendez Introduce Bill to Clearly Define and Ban Unlawful
Insider Trading, supra note 158.
167. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232.
168. Himes Introduces Bipartisan Bill to Define and Prohibit Illegal Insider
Trading, (Mar. 25, 2015), http://himes.house.gov/press-release/himes-introduces-
bipartisan-bill-define-and-prohibit-illegal-insider-trading.
169. Id.
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(1) the other person -
(A) purchases, sells, or causes the purchase or sale of, any
security or security-based swap or enters into or causes the entry
into any security-based swap agreement, to which such
communication relates; or
(B) communicates the information to another person who makes
or causes such a purchase, sale, or entry while in possession of such
information; and
(2) such a purchase, sale, or entry while in possession of such
information is reasonably foreseeable.
(c) Standard and Knowledge Requirement. - [Discussed below]
(2) Knowledge Requirement. - It shall not be necessary that the
person trading while in possession of such information ... or
making the communication ... know the specific means by which
the information was obtained or communicated, or whether any
personal benefit was paid or promised by or to any person in the
chain of communication, so long as the person trading while in
possession of such information or making the communication, as
the case may be, was aware, or recklessly disregarded that such
information was wrongfully obtained or communicated.1 70
The language of H.R. 1625 is more thorough and specific than
Senate Bill 702. Like Senate Bill 702, it contains constructive
knowledge language - "person knows, or recklessly disregards" -
but unlike Senate Bill 702, it retains the duty element, rather than
omitting it and shifting the focus entirely from duty to knowledge. 17i
In section (c)(1)(C), the bill defines "wrongfully" as "conversion,
misappropriation, or other unauthorized and deceptive taking of such
information, or a breach of any fiduciary duty or any other personal or
other relationship of trust and confidence."' 7 2
H.R. 1625 is an improvement. Its language, "other relationship of
trust and confidence[,]"17 3 is more aligned with the misappropriation
theory's "duty to the source of the information" holding since the
broad language presumably includes the fiduciary duty to an employer
who provides confidential information to his employee.' 7 4  The
170. Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. (2015).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id
174. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-53.
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weakness with the bill's language is its failure to define "recklessly
disregard" in the context of the securities market.' 7 5 This omission
creates ambiguity as to which types of remote tippees would be liable.
For example, would an average individual who overhears material,
nonpublic information and buys stocks for the first time on the basis
of that information be liable? What if the tippee is a sophisticated
hedge fund manager who trusts his sources to not base their analysis
on unlawful information? The ambiguity in the language will only
create a new line of case law with conflicting decisions on which
tippees showed reckless disregard.
The final bill is H.R. 1173, titled "Ban Insider Trading Act of
2015," and is authored by Congressman Stephen F. Lynch.1 76
Congressman Lynch describes his bill as the need to "prohibi[t] the
use of material inside information outright, the Ban Insider Trading
Act of 2015 will better safeguard the integrity of our markets by
protecting powerful information from being abused at the expense of
average investors."l 7 7 The relevant language of the bill is as follows:
(d) Trading On Material Inside Information. -
"(1) IN GENERAL. - To purchase or sell any security, or any
securities-based swap agreement, based on information that the
person knows or, considering factors including financial
sophistication, knowledge of and experience in financial matters,
position in a company, and amount of assets under management,
should know is material information and inside information.
As with the bills mentioned above, H.R. 1173 uses the language
"should know" to include constructive knowledge.1 79  The main
difference is that constructive knowledge is measured through factors
such as financial sophistication, assets controlled, and position in
company, which helps distinguish remote tippee liability between the
financially unsophisticated individual and the sophisticated hedge
175. See H.R.1625.
176. Lynch Introduces Bill to Ban Insider Trading, STEPHEN LYNCH (Mar. 2,
2015), http://lynch.house.gov/press-release/lynch-introduces-bill-ban-insider-
trading.
177. Id.
178. Ban Insider Trading Act of 2015, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong. (2015).
179. Id.
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fund manager.s1 8  However, the language of the bill is slightly unclear
on whether the focus of liability is duty or knowledge, as it only
mentions breach of a fiduciary duty in the section defining "inside
information."' 8 1 Instead, duty should be expressly included in the
main language of the bill to avoid reverting back to the equal access
theory.
All three of the bills have potential, but each requires clarification
to eliminate the ambiguity or other issues mentioned above. The
silver lining is that both sides of Congress are aware of the tippee
liability issue that Newman brought to attention, and both are taking
steps to remedy that uncertain area of securities regulation. The
following section suggests a test that is a hybrid of the established
case law and proposed Congressional bills.
D. A New Liability Standard For Remote Tippees
To protect confidentiality and the efficiency of the securities
market, Congress should consider amending one of its current
proposed bills to solve the remote tippee issue by shifting the focus
from derived duty from the tipper to the actual or constructive
knowledge of the tippee.
Accordingly, the standard should be: "Tippee liability is based on
the individual(s) knowledge of the breach of a fiduciary duty by the
tipper to the source of the material, nonpublic information. Thus, a
tippee is liable if he or she, (1) had such actual or constructive
knowledge; (2) that the material, nonpublic information was acquired
in breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of that confidential
information; and (3) still trades on the basis of that information before
it is properly disclosed to the public."
Here, "constructive knowledge" is defined as "information that
the individual knew or should have known based on his or her own
personal or professional experience such as his or her current position
or job; financial or securities sophistication; and/or previous or current
degree of trades." As for "fiduciary duty to source of information," it
would resemble the O'Hagan holding 82 but include any fiduciary
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-53.
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duties created by special relationships, including that of a
sophisticated hedge fund manager or an investor and the general
securities market. Under this test, the employee of the printing
services shop in Chiarella would have had a fiduciary duty to the
source of information, which in that case was a company that
entrusted the printing employee with takeover bids data."'
However, imagine if the Chiarella facts were expanded to include
a neighbor of the printer, who has little knowledge of securities.
Imagine the neighbor learns about the takeover bids of the company
through common neighborly small talk in the driveway, and passes
this confidential information to his brother. Furthermore, the brother
(i.e., remote tippee) has twenty years of investing experience and
owns an investing firm. Once he learns about material, nonpublic
information, he trades on the basis of that knowledge. O 'Hagan 's
holding1 84 would not be sufficient in this case because here the
outsider owes no duty to anyone from the company and is not the
direct tippee of the printer.
The result would be different under the test proposed here. Under
this test, the brother's experience and sophistication imparts upon him
a responsibility - based on constructive knowledge - to discover
whether the takeover bid information was material, nonpublic
information obtained by someone's breach of fiduciary duty. He
could easily confirm his suspicion by asking colleagues or his own
analysts about the information's value and if it is available to the
public. If he discovered it was material, nonpublic information, he
would have to abstain from trading because his sophistication creates
him into, in essence, a non-traditional and temporary insider.' 85
Now consider the hypothetical mentioned in the Introduction
regarding your client, the junior analyst who was hired for his inside
knowledge rather than experience at Exxon mobile. There is no doubt
that Exxon's corporate insider, who gave your client material,
nonpublic information would be liable under current securities law.
Your client, even though he is less culpable, would also be liable
under this new test since he failed to properly disclose the confidential
information to the SEC or the source.
183. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
184. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652-53.
185. Tex. Gulf 401 F.2d at 848.
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Yet, unlike the holdings in Newman or O'Hagan, the executive of
the firm (i.e., remote tippee) who traded on the basis of the
confidential information would not escape liability simply because: (a)
he had no direct duty to the source of the information; (b) had no
actual knowledge of the breach of fiduciary; or (c) was unaware of
any personal benefit, if any, gained by the tipper. Instead, the
executive of the firm would have the constructive knowledge that the
information was acquired by a breach of fiduciary duty because of his
experience as an executive and his sophistication in securities. The
executive would know that the type of information his analysts were
basing their projections on was not public information and would be
aware of the reasons they hired your client in the first place. This
sophisticated remote tippee would be a non-traditional and temporary
insider who is liable because he traded on basis of the confidential
information acquired by breach of fiduciary duty to the source, and he
had constructive knowledge of such fact.
Similarly, Newman and Chiasson would be liable under this test
because their sophistication and experience should have reasonably
created red flags surrounding several suspicious facts within the
information, such as: the exact accuracy of the earnings predictions;
the time and date of their source's ability to communicate such data;
and the degree of profitability from his subsequent trades.' 86
It is difficult to imagine that such a sophisticated remote tippee
could deny having constructive knowledge after receiving such quality
and timely information unless of course the tippee is consciously
avoiding confirming the facts regarding the lawfulness of the
information. But there is no doubt that, other than the tippers, these
sophisticated remote tippees are, and should remain, the most culpable
of securities fraud. This test prevents such sophisticated remote
tippees from turning a blind eye to the legality of the information they
encounter. In short, raising the standard for liability as Newman did
was not the proper solution and only worsened the remote tippee
issue.
186. Brief for the United States, supra note 111, at 70-71.
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V. CONCLUSION
The result in Newman has major implications on trading in the
securities market, confidentiality, and the overall health of the
economy.
It was not surprising when the Supreme Court denied certiorari,' 8
given the Court's history of reviewing few insider trading cases
involving the misappropriation theory. Now the future of remote
tippee liability is in the hands of Congress, who is better suited to
provide the necessary changes. It is appropriate to rely on Congress to
shape remote tippee liability because it is both more representative of
the public than the Supreme Court and has the checks and balances to
provide discussion on the balance between confidentiality and
securities market efficiency.
The SEC has also become more vocal about alternations to the
current standard. With regard to brokers giving advice, the
Chairwoman has stated that she would prefer a uniform standard of
fiduciary duty, and that the SEC has the authority to create such
standard.1 88  Of course, the SEC might not feel as strongly about
tippee liability to the point it executes such unilateral authority.
Regardless, the Newman decision has significantly changed the
landscape of insider trading, and Congress should have the final word
on such change.
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